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The under-representation of women in parliaments worldwide warrants attention at the 
underlying sources. This study examines one potential source: the countries’ constitutions. 
Based on a large cross-country dataset, we demonstrate that women’s representation in 
parliament is larger in countries with constitutional protection from gender-based 
discrimination. Our baseline estimates suggest that the presence of such protection results in 
over a three and a half percentage point increase in women’s share of parliamentary seats. We 
probe some underlying mechanisms and show that places with constitutional protection from 
gender-based discrimination are likely to have legislations directly targeting women’s under-
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INTRODUCTION 
An important expression of agency is having a voice in society and influencing policy (World 
Bank 2011). However, women currently have less input than men in decision making in their 
communities and societies as they are heavily underrepresented in politics and government, 
especially in its upper reaches. Countries have made slow but significant progress on 
Millennium Development Goal 3, of “promoting gender equality and empowering women” 
(United Nations 2015). However, in many countries, gender inequality persists and women 
continue to face discrimination in political decision-making. As of 2014, only 39 countries 
(20.9 per cent of countries globally) had met the target set by the U.N. Economics and Social 
Council in 1990 of having 30 per cent or more women in national legislative seats (World 
Bank 2014). Addressing this important gender gap in agency will require a continuous and 
proactive policy commitment to gender equality. And the development of new policy will 
require a strong evidence base that incorporates recent advances in knowledge and makes use 
of available data and indicators. 
This paper investigates the available knowledge and data on a key aspect of the 
current barriers to women’s agency: their under-representation in parliamentary decision-
making. This expression of agency is important to women’s lives, with current evidence 
indicating that women’s representation in parliament influences policies in ways that are 
more relevant to the preferences of women (e.g. Sonia Bhalotra and Irma Clots-Figueras 
2014; Raghabendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo 2004).  However, the legislative and 
other factors that influence women’s parliamentary representation are poorly understood. 
This paper’s particular focus is on the role of formal legal institutions in enhancing 
women’s agency through parliamentary representation. We pursue the idea that constitutional 
protection from gender-based discrimination can bolster women’s exercise of agency, by 
formalizing their individual and collective rights and providing them with frameworks to 
exercise their voice (World Bank 2012).  
As such, the paper pursues some important themes of recent feminist legal and 
political scholarship. Helen Irving (2008, 1), for example, argues that a country’s constitution 
has gender impacts partly because it frames “women’s membership of, or absence from, the 
constitutional community.” Posing the rhetorical question “what do women want from a 
constitution?”, Irving (2008, 21) responds that, amongst other things, women want full 
opportunities for participation, and access to political positions and public office.   
Beverly Barnes and Ruth Rubio-Marin (2005, 7-8) express a similar perspective. 
They observe that women who are active in feminist movements have begun to identify 
constitutions and constitutional change as relevant to our lives. They observe a number of 
important reasons for this, including the capacity that constitutional rights provide to women 
to challenge state activity in the courts, the visibility of constitutional provisions, and the 
tendency for constitutional rights to ‘permeate’ the general legal culture. Adele Cassola, Amy 
Raub, Danielle Folet and Jody Heymann (2014, 202) add to this list of reasons for feminist 
scholars to pay attention to constitutions, noting that constitutional gender protections can be 
leveraged to:  
…oppose the passage of discriminatory legislation, litigate against existing laws and 
practices that violate women’s rights, challenge customary and religious traditions 
that restrict gender equality, and encourage the passage of new legislation that 
promotes equal rights for women. 
It is interesting to note in this context then that although there has been a substantial history 
of women’s involvement in constitutional design, and gender analysis has been applied to a 
range of countries’ constitutions, there is scant literature on the broad, cross-national 
principles of constitutional design (see Irving, 2008, 28). Indeed, Barnes and Rubio-Marin 
(2005, 2) identify “a huge gap – a gender gap – in contemporary constitutional analysis.”   
Barnes and Rubio-Marin (2005) attempted to redress this gap in the literature by 
examining the constitutions and constitutional jurisprudence in twelve countries (Australia, 
Canada, Colombia, Cost Rica, France, Germany, India, Israel, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, 
and the United States). Georgina Waylen (2006) pursued a similar approach in her study of 
the role of constitutions in the enhancement of women’s rights. Waylen conducted four 
detailed case studies (of Brazil in the 1980s, and South Africa, Poland and Argentina in the 
1990s) and was especially concerned with assessing the effectiveness of constitutional 
change as a strategy for enhancing gender rights. Adele Cassola, Amy Raub, Danielle Folet 
and Jody Heymann (2014) took a more quantitative approach, and attempted to analyze data 
on the constitutional rights entrenched in 191 countries with the aim of describing the status 
of equal rights across genders in the world’s constitutions. They also document how 
constitutional gender provisions have evolved over time, and identify patterns of regional 
variation. 
The conclusions of each of these studies identify the important role that constitutions 
can play in protecting and enhancing gender rights. However, each of the studies have also 
emphasised that the effects of constitutional change on women’s rights is likely to depend 
heavily on the conditions and context of the change, including the country’s legal traditions, 
its constitutional hermeneutics, and the presence of key participants who are open to gender 
concerns and prepared to take them on board. A common assessment is that whilst 
constitutional gender protections should not be viewed as a panacea for gender inequality, 
they do represent a valuable tool that can be used in the struggle for greater equality. 
Our study contributes new empirical evidence on the relationship between 
constitutional gender provisions and gender equality by contributing a broad, cross-country 
overview of the relationship between constitutional anti-discrimination provisions and 
women’s parliamentary representation. We provide the first empirical evidence in support of 
the argument that constitutional design is an important institutional factor promoting 
women’s political agency. Furthermore, we show that the entrenchment of a protection from 
gender-based discrimination in such a fundamental document as a country’s constitution, 
gives rise to additional institutional factors previously shown to contribute to women’s 
parliamentary representation. 
 
LITERATURE ON WOMEN’S PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION 
Our study also builds on a relatively large empirical literature on the determinants of 
women’s parliamentary representation. A range of empirical studies has sought to explain 
cross-national variations in the numbers of women elected to parliament. They have largely 
converged around three sets of factors: socio-economic, institutional and cultural (see, for 
example, Pamela Paxton, Sheri Kunovich and Melanie M. Hughes 2007, for a review). To 
date, however, the role of constitutional protection from discrimination has not been 
examined as an institutional factor promoting women’s parliamentary representation. 
Socio-economic factors are often regarded as the “supply-side” of politics (e.g. Vicky 
Randall 1987; Pippa Norris 1997) and are thought to influence the pool of potential female 
politicians. Explanations traditionally have focused on the levels of economic development 
and women’s socio-economic status. Economic development can contribute to women’s 
increased involvement in the public sphere through a number of mechanisms. First, economic 
development generally leads to a change in the nature of available jobs that are more 
conducive to women’s paid work (e.g. Claudia Goldin 2006a; Claudia Goldin 2006b). 
Second, if economic development helps to liberate women from housework (e.g. Jeremy 
Greenwood, Ananth Seshadri and Mehmet Yorukoglu 2005) and results in new patterns of 
their fertility (e.g. Grant Miller 2010), it can help women achieve greater independence and 
improve their capacity to pursue political careers. According to Pippa Norris and Ronald 
Inglehart (2001), the first phase of industrialization sees significant advances in women’s 
educational attainment and their participation in representative government; they gain greater 
political influence in the second, post-industrial phase. However, not all types of economic 
development promote gender equality. Michael L. Ross (2008), in particular, argues that 
when economic development is based on oil and mineral extraction, it discourages women 
from entering the labour force and reduces their political representation.  
The empirical evidence for the impact of socio-economic factors on women’s 
parliamentary representation is mixed. Measures of economic development have been found 
to be significant in some previous studies of women’s parliamentary representation (e.g. Ian 
McAllister and Donley T. Studlar 2002; Mark M. Gray, Miki Caul Kittilson and Wayne 
Sandholtz 2006) but not in others (e.g. Lane Kenworthy and Melissa Malami 1999; Pamela 
Paxton and Sheri Kunovich 2003). However, most empirical studies conducted to date have 
confirmed the importance of a country’s economic structure and in particular, the negative 
implications of its endowments of oil reserves, for women’s participation (Michael L. Ross 
2008; Alice Kang 2009).  
Several studies have considered specific mechanisms by which economic 
development may affect women’s parliamentary representation, focusing on different 
measures of women’s education and labour force status. With respect to women’s educational 
attainment, there has been little evidence to support its link with women’s parliamentary 
representation (e.g. Lane Kenworthy and Melissa Malami 1999; Pamela Paxton and Sheri 
Kunovich 2003). Similarly, a correlation between women’s labour participation and their 
parliamentary representation has been documented in some cases (e.g. Torben Iversen and 
Frances Rosenbluth 2008; Daniel Stockemer and Maeve Byrne 2012) but not others (Lane 
Kenworthy and Melissa Malami 1999; Didier Ruedin 2012). While the role of employment in 
specific professions has been emphasized, no consistent evidence for its relationship with 
women’s parliamentary representation has been provided (e.g. Pamela Paxton 1997; Lane 
Kenworthy and Melissa Malami 1999).   
A wide range of institutional factors generate differences in the “demand” for 
women’s political representation (Pamela Paxton, Sheri Kunovich and Melanie M. Hughes 
2007). By shaping the rules of the game, these factors influence the likelihood that women 
will be pulled into political office. Among the institutional factors, the level of democracy, 
electoral systems and gender quotas have been a particular focus of the literature (e.g. Pamela 
Paxton, Melanie M. Hughes and Matthew A. Painter 2010). However, the link between 
democracy and women’s parliamentary representation is theoretically ambiguous. Women 
may encounter clearer rules and less arbitrary constraints when competing in elections under 
democracies. In non-democracies, on the other hand, there is scope for women to be placed 
into power even when they do not enjoy widespread public support (e.g. Jude Howell 2002). 
The role of the electoral system appears to be more certain, with proportional representation 
systems generally thought to be more conducive than plurality/majority systems to increasing 
women’s representation (see, for example, Richard E. Matland 2005, for a detailed 
discussion). Proportional representation systems often have higher district magnitudes, which 
facilitate women’s inclusion since the number of members elected per district increases, and 
closed party lists, which enable parties to place women in higher rank orders (e,g. Mona Lena 
Krook 2010). Finally, gender quotas are increasingly seen as an important instrument to 
achieve balanced gender representation in politics. As Esther Duflo (2012) argues, “…in the 
absence of affirmative action of some sort, it would be very difficult for women to break into 
politics”.  
A large body of empirical literature has tested the relevance of institutional factors for 
women’s parliamentary representation across countries. The evidence on the relationship 
between democracy and women’s parliamentary representation is mixed. The documented 
effect of democracy on women’s parliamentary representation ranges from negative (e.g. 
Pamela Paxton 1997) to positive (e.g. Pamela Paxton, Melanie M. Hughes and Matthew A. 
Painter 2010), while many studies find no statistically significant relationship (e.g. Lane 
Kenworthy and Melissa Malami 1999; Pamela Paxton and Sheri Kunovich 2003). 
Considering the features of electoral systems, many studies find the women’s representation 
to be higher in countries with proportional representation electoral systems (Andrew 
Reynolds 1999; Ian McAllister and Donley T. Studlar 2002). However, some find that its 
significance holds up only in Western industrialised democracies (Melanie M. Hughes 2009; 
Mona Lena Krook 2010). Gender quotas have been shown to significantly positively 
correlate with women’s parliamentary representation in a number of studies (e.g. Li-Ju  Chen 
2010; Maria De Paola, Vincenzo Scoppa and Rosetta Lombardo 2010).   
The third set of explanations for women’s parliamentary representation focuses on 
cultural and ideological factors, which influence both the supply of and the demand for 
female candidates. As Pamela Paxton, Sheri Kunovich and Melanie M. Hughes (2007) argue, 
“…cultural ideas about women can affect women’s levels of representation throughout the 
political process, from an individual woman’s decision to enter politics, to party selection of 
candidates, to the decisions made by voters on election day”. Studies have considered various 
sources of cultural attitudes, such as geographic location, religion and colonial history. 
Warfare may also impact the beliefs about gender roles by, on one hand, causing societies to 
become more hierarchical and male dominated, and on the other hand, generating a greater 
need for female involvement in economic and political fields outside of the home (Alberto 
Alesina, Paola Giuliano and Nathan Nunn 2013). Melanie M. Hughes (2009) argues that 
warfare may affect women’s parliamentary representation not only through cultural but also 
through socio-economic and political forces.  
Empirical studies have provided some evidence on the role of cultural and ideological 
factors. With respect to geographical location some studies find, for example, that Asia and 
Middle East have lower levels of female representation, while Scandinavian and “Marxist-
Leninist” countries have higher levels of female participation in parliament (e.g. Pamela 
Paxton 1997; Pamela Paxton and Sheri Kunovich 2003). There is also some evidence to 
support the role of religious beliefs in driving women’s parliamentary representation, 
however it is not conclusive. In particular, the argument that Muslim countries hold gender 
values detrimental to women’s representation in parliament has received support in some 
studies (e.g. Lane Kenworthy and Melissa Malami 1999; Andrew Reynolds 1999), but not in 
others (e.g. Pamela Paxton 1997; Michael L. Ross 2008). With respect to differences across 
religions, Andrew Reynolds (1999) finds that the greatest contrasts are between 
predominantly Christian countries and countries of other religions, including Islam. Because 
of the influence of Western European colonization on the subsequent development of 
institutions, studies have considered the impact of colonial history on women’s parliamentary 
participation. However, no conclusive evidence has been arrived at (e.g. Pamela Paxton, 
Melanie M. Hughes and Jennifer L. Green 2006; Kathleen M. Fallon, Liam Swiss and 
Jocelyn Viterna 2012). Finally, considering the implications of warfare, Melanie M. Hughes 
(2009) finds that certain types of civil conflict positively affect women’s parliamentary 
representation.  
 
DATA AND APPROACH 
Whilst a large empirical literature on the determinants of women’s parliamentary 
representation clearly now exists, the role of constitutions in affecting the share of women 
elected to parliament has thus far not been explored. We attempt to address this gap in the 
literature by considering, first, the direct link between constitutional protection from gender-
based discrimination and women’s parliamentary representation. We also explore possible 
indirect linkages, including those between constitutional protection from gender-based 
discrimination and other institutional factors relevant to women’s parliamentary 
representation, such as gender quotas.  
Our analysis of the effect of constitutional protection from gender-based 
discrimination on women’s parliamentary representation is based on a cross-section of 
countries in 2011 - the latest year for which data on variables relevant for our study are 
available for a large sample of countries. Many previous studies of women’s parliamentary 
representation have dealt with small sample sizes (e.g. Ian McAllister and Donley T. Studlar 
2002; Pamela Paxton and Sheri Kunovich 2003), and may have suffered from regional biases, 
despite their universalizing assertions (Mona Lena Krook 2010). Our study does not face that 
shortcoming. After dropping observations with missing data on key variables, we still remain 
with 106 countries in the baseline sample, covering different regions of the world. Our 
analysis is based on a multivariate regression framework that includes a wide range of 
variables derived from well-established data sources. In contrast with most previous studies, 
we consider the problem of endogeneity in estimating the relationship between constitutional 
protection and women’s parliamentary representation by utilising 2SLS regressions, in 
addition to our baseline OLS regressions. Below we provide the details on the measurement 
of variables and our estimation approach.  
 
Variables 
The set of variables used in the baseline regressions, together with details on their 
measurement and sources is outlined in the first two columns of Table 1. Our dependent 
variable is women in parliament defined as the percentage of parliamentary seats in a single 
or lower chamber held by women and comes from the World Bank (2014) (sourced from the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union). This measure is widely used in other cross-country studies of 
women’s political representation (e.g. Lane Kenworthy and Melissa Malami 1999; Eileen 
McDonagh 2002; Michael L. Ross 2008; Pamela Paxton, Melanie M. Hughes and Matthew 
A. Painter 2010).  
The key explanatory variable of interest is the presence of constitutional protection 
against gender-based discrimination, which is derived from Women, Business and the Law 
(WBL), a publication on gender differentiations in legal treatment that affects women’s 
opportunities, jointly produced by the International Finance Corporation and the World Bank. 
WBL is “the only dataset measuring the gender gap in legislation using quantitative and 
objective data”. The dataset offers several unique features (International Finance Corporation 
and World Bank 2012). First, it is based on information derived directly from laws and 
regulations. Second, because standard assumptions are used when collecting data, 
comparisons are valid across economies. The data was collected in three waves, current as of 
June 2009, March 2011 and April 2013. Mohammad Amin and Asif Islam (2014) recently 
used the same data source in their cross-country study of the effects of non-discrimination 
clauses in hiring practices on women’s employment. 
WBL provides information on whether a “non-discrimination clause covering gender 
or sex” is present in a country’s constitution. Based on this information we define a variable 
constitutional protection that takes on the value of 1  “if the constitution explicitly includes 
gender or sex as protected categories for non-discrimination” and 0 if  “there is no non-
discrimination provision, or if there is a non-discrimination provision that does not include 
gender or sex as a protected category” (International Finance Corporation and World Bank 
2012). This variable is defined based on the data from 2011, the latest year for which data on 
other variables used in our study are available for a large sample of countries. In our sample 
of 106 countries, 67 per cent have such constitutional protection. 
To single out the effect of constitutional protection on women’s parliamentary 
representation, our analysis incorporates controls for a number of other potential 
determinants. We attempt to include measures of the variables identified as important in 
previous studies. However, we also select from the list to avoid the danger of over-
controlling, given that some of these variables may be endogenous to constitutional 
protection. In particular, we do not include measures of women’s education and labour 
market status, or the presence of gender quotas, as these are potentially left-hand side 
variables with respect to constitutional protection and may also be mechanisms by which 
constitutional protection affects women’s parliamentary representation. Therefore, we would 
be estimating the effect of constitutional protection on women’s parliamentary representation 
other than its effect through these variables, if they were included in the model. Leaving these 
variables out is necessary to obtain an estimate of the total effect of constitutional protection 
on women’s parliamentary representation.
3
  
First, we incorporate socio-economic factors. GDP per capita is one of the most 
widely used measures of economic development particularly in the literature on women’s 
representation in labour force and politics (e.g. Ian McAllister and Donley T. Studlar 2002;  
Michael L. Ross 2008; Mohammad Amin and Asif Islam 2014). Accordingly, we control for 
economic development by including a measure of GDP per capita (in logs) and its square 
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 We do attempt a robustness check with women’s share of the labour force (which is likely 
to incorporate their educational attainment, among other things) included as an additional 
variable to explain women’s parliamentary representation. The results are reported in Table 5. 
In an additional set of results reported in Table 6, we document the explanatory power of 
constitutional protection over the presence of gender quotas for women’s parliamentary 
representation.   
term.
4
 Additionally, to reflect the implications of a country’s economic structure for women’s 
participation, we include oil rents as a share of GDP as a control variable. Furthermore, 
following Michael L. Ross (2008), we also control for a country’s share of economically 
active population due to its potentially significant effect on economic development due to the 
added productivity of this group.  
Second, we add measures of the institutional determinants of women’s parliamentary 
representation as controls. We include a dummy for proportional representation electoral 
systems. In addition, we control for a country’s level of democracy by including their Polity 
score – a standard measure based on Polity IV database (Monty Marshall and Keith Jaggers 
2014).  In an effort to single out the effect of constitutional protection from other legal rules 
relevant for women’s political representation, we additionally control for three sub-traditions 
of civil law – French, German and Scandinavian with English common law being the 
excluded category. A large body of research has shown that the historical origin of a 
country’s laws is highly correlated with a broad range of its legal rules and regulations, as 
well as with economic outcomes (Rafael La Porta, Florencio  Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei 
Shleifer 2008). Furthermore, the history of constitutionalism is another factor that may have 
broad implications for the presence of constitutional protection as well as outcomes 
correlated with women’s representation, such as the stability and different characteristics of 
the governing regime. We therefore additionally control for the number of years since 
enactment of a country’s constitution.  
 Finally, we include factors to represent cultural norms relating to women’s 
representation. We control for Muslim and Christian shares of the population. A country’s 
share of European descendant population is included as a control, to capture the influence of 
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 Claudia Goldin (1995) suggests that there is a U-shaped relationship between economic 
development and women’s labour force participation. 
mass European migration on beliefs around gender norms (Alberto Alesina, Paola Giuliano 
and Nathan Nunn 2013). Communist policies were dominated by concerns about labour 
shortages, the imperative of industrialization and values of equality, resulting in women being 
absorbed into the labour force rapidly (Anna Pollert 2003). To capture the influence of such 
policies on women’s representation, we include a dummy for a country’s communist past. To 
reflect the consequences of warfare for beliefs about gender roles, we include controls for the 







We test the hypothesis that constitutional protection from gender-based discrimination will 
bolster women’s parliamentary representation by estimating regressions of the following 
form:  
𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑖 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛼3𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                                  (1) 
where 𝑖 indices countries; 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑖 is the share of parliamentary seats in a single or lower 
chamber held by women; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 is a dummy for a country whose constitution has a non-
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 By including continent fixed effects we do not explicitly control for the Middle East, a 
region where women lag in their representation. However, rather than proxying for the 
potential disadvantage faced by the women of the Middle East through the use of a region 
fixed effect term, we use two direct measures: Oil rents and Muslim share of the population. 
This approach of directly controlling for key region-specific determinants of women’s 
representation instead of a region itself is consistent with other studies in the literature (e.g. 
Andrew Reynolds 1999; Alberto Alesina, Paola Giuliano and Nathan Nunn 2013).  
 
discrimination clause covering gender or sex;  𝑋𝑖 denotes the baseline control variables from 
Table 1 and 𝜀 is an unobservable component with a zero mean and a finite variance.  
Our estimation proceeds in several steps. First, we estimate the above regression 
equation to measure the correlations between the key variables of interest. This produces a set 
of baseline results. Second, we provide a number of robustness checks, and in particular, 
address the various problems in drawing inferences about the nature of causal relationships 
from the baseline results. Specifically, while parliamentary representation, as well as other 
variables, are defined as of 2011 in our baseline estimations (unless explicitly specified 
otherwise), we attempt an estimation with a single, longer time period where we link the 
average of women’s parliamentary representation over the ten years leading to 2011, with 
constitutional protection and other controls at the start of that period. This approach helps to 
diminish the likelihood of reverse causation. In a further step, we address the concerns over 
endogeneity directly, by means of IV estimation. We hypothesize that the comprehensiveness 
of a constitution in terms of the total number of rights provisions could be a valid instrument 
for the provision on non-discrimination on the basis of gender. We discuss this instrumental 
variable strategy and demonstrate its validity in the robustness checks section.  
An alternative approach to deal with the problem of endogeneity would be to use a 
panel data analysis of constitutional protection and women’s representation in parliament. 
Having more than one observation for a country, we could control for time invariant 
unobservable characteristics of countries. However, constitutions do not often change over 
short periods of time. With respect to constitutional protection from gender-based 
discrimination, in the 20 years from 1990-2010, for example, only 32 out of the sample of 
100 countries on which there is data have recorded a change (International Finance 
Corporation and World Bank 2014).  Hence we choose to have a larger and more diverse 




In the last three columns of Table 1, we report the descriptive statistics (means, standard 
deviations, minimum and maximum values) of all the variables included in our baseline 
analysis. Table 2 reports the means and standard deviations of the key variables of interest, 
constitutional protection and women in parliament, in different sub-samples. In the whole 
sample, 67 per cent of countries have constitutional protection, however, in the group of 
OECD countries this rate falls to 50 per cent. There are also differences across authority 
regimes, with constitutional protection more common in non-democracies (72 per cent) than 
in democracies (65 per cent).  
Women’s representation in parliament, which averages at 19.5 per cent, also exhibits 
a significant degree of variation across groups of countries. Importantly, given the research 
question pursued in this paper, it is only marginally lower (at 18.9 per cent) in countries 
without constitutional protection than in countries with protection (19.8 per cent). 
Nevertheless, the difference in women’s parliamentary representation between places with 
and without constitutional protection persists when keeping income and democracy constant. 
Among OECD countries, women’s representation is 23.2 per cent in places with no 
constitutional protection and 27.8 per cent in places with constitutional protection. Likewise, 
in the group of non-OECD countries, women’s representation is 15.2 per cent in places with 
no constitutional protection and 17.4 per cent in places with constitutional protection. We 
observe similar patterns when considering the differences by authority regimes: in both 
democracies and non-democracies, women’s representation is higher in places with 
constitutional protection. In the empirical analysis below we show that after controlling for a 
number of other characteristics of countries, we observe a substantial positive effect of 
constitutional protection on women’s parliamentary representation.  
 
Baseline model 
We further examine the relationship between constitutional protection and women’s 
parliamentary representation through a regression analysis. In column (1) of Table 3 we 
report the results of an OLS regression that include countries’ socio-economic characteristics 
as controls. In these results, constitutional protection has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on women in parliament. We also find a U-shaped relationship between 
economic development and women’s representation in parliament. Furthermore, in 
accordance with the finding by Michael L. Ross (2008), we observe a negative impact of a 
country’s endowments of oil rents (measured as a share of GDP) on women’s representation 
in parliament.  
In the next step of our investigation we additionally include measures of the 
institutional environment in the OLS regression model. The results are reported in column 
(2). They indicate that in the presence of these controls, the magnitude of the relationship 
between constitutional protection and women in parliament falls, however, it nevertheless 
remains significant. The relationships between variables relating to economic development 
and oil rents as a share of GDP, and women’s parliamentary representation also remain 
statistically significant in these estimates. The results in column (2) additionally indicate that 
countries with a Scandinavian legal origin and those with older constitutions have more 
women in parliament. The estimated coefficient on the variable proportional representation, 
while positive and large in magnitude, is statistically insignificant. Consistent with a 
substantial prior literature (e.g. Lane Kenworthy and Melissa Malami 1999; Pamela Paxton 
and Sheri Kunovich 2003), we do not find a statistically significant effect of democracy on 
women in parliament. 
Column (3) reports the results of regressions where the list of explanatory variables is 
further augmented to include measures of cultural norms that might influence women’s 
participation in parliament. The inclusion of these measures does not alter the estimated 
relationship between constitutional protection and women in parliament or the relationship 
between the measures of economic and institutional environment and women’s representation 
(except for the coefficient on age of constitution which turns insignificant). Of the “cultural 
variables”, European descent share has a positive impact on women’s representation. This is 
unsurprising, given that this variable is used to proxy for the degree of Western European 
influence, a pioneering region with respect to the institutions favourable to women’s 
representation. However, in the final model, reported in column (4), where we include 
continent dummy variables to control for differences in geographic location, this variable is 
no longer a statistically significant factor. The estimated coefficient on constitutional 
protection with and without continent dummies are essentially identical suggesting that it is 
not only identified from broad differences across different parts of the world, but from finer 
within-region variation.  
Our estimates on constitutional protection are not only statistically significant they are 
also economically meaningful. Based on the estimates in column (4), comparing countries 
similar in a wide range of socio-economic, institutional and cultural characteristics and 
located within the same world regions, women’s share of parliamentary seats is, on average, 
3.5 percentage points higher in countries with constitutional protection from gender-based 
discrimination. This is equal to 18.1 per cent of the sample mean for women in parliament 
and 33.5 per cent of its standard deviation. 
 
Robustness checks 
We first consider the robustness of our results to influential observations. These are 
observations that, if deleted, could substantially alter important features of the analysis. We 
apply two standard rules to identifying the potentially influential observations. In column (1) 
of Table 4, we use the DFITS measure, which captures changes in the OLS slopes as 
individual observations are dropped from the sample, whereas in column (2) we use the 
DFBETA measure, which assesses how individual coefficients change as observations are 
dropped from the sample (see David A. Belsely, Edwin Kuh and Roy E. Welsch 1980 for 
details). We then re-estimate the OLS regressions excluding the corresponding set of possible 
influential data points. Baseline country controls and continent dummies are included in these 
and all the subsequent regressions, but not reported (available on request). The estimated 
coefficient on constitutional protection remains statistically significant when influential 
observations are removed. Moreover, using DFITS to eliminate influential observations 
results in an increase in the magnitude of the estimated coefficient to 4.533 from the baseline 
3.529 (column (1)). 
Next, we consider the robustness of the results to using alternative sets of control 
variables. While widely used, GDP per capita is by no means a perfect measure of economic 
development.  Since the literature predominantly regards socio-economic variables as the 
“supply-side” of politics (e.g. Vicky Randall 1987; Pippa Norris 1997), the use of GDP per 
capita measure in baseline models controls for distributional effects. To allow for the 
possibility that economic development can also be a “demand-side” variable, we additionally 
control for the level of GDP (column (3) of Table 4). The estimated coefficient on 
constitutional protection remains robust to this change in the set of socio-economic controls. 
The coefficients on Ln GDP per capita and Ln GDP terms are insignificant under this 
specification. Additionally, we consider the use of GNI instead of GDP as our measure of 
economic development to allow for the possibility that the material wellbeing of the residents 
of a country, along with foreign income, affects the key relationships. We re-estimate models 
with GNI per capita (and its squared term) (column (4)); and GNI per capita and level of GNI 
(column 5) used as our measures of economic development. The estimated coefficients on 
constitutional protection change remarkably little compared to the baseline estimates. The 
estimated coefficients on the GNI terms are insignificant.  
 We also consider the robustness of the results to using alternative measures of 
women’s political representation as the dependent variable. Our baseline model is based on 
cross-sectional data in 2011. One concern with this approach is that it increases the likelihood 
of reverse causation. This issue is unlikely to be a substantial problem as less than a third out 
of the sample of 100 countries for which there is data recorded a change in their constitutions 
between 1990 and 2010 (International Finance Corporation and World Bank 2014). 
Nevertheless, to address the possibility of reverse causation we consider an alternative model 
whereby we use women’s parliamentary representation averaged over the 10 years period 
from 2002-2011 (the data come from International Finance Corporation and World Bank 
2014, a source documenting the evolution of gender parity in laws in 100 countries). Column 
(7) of Table 4 reports the results using this dependent variable with constitutional protection 
and other time-variant controls measured as of 2002. This test also helps us gauge the 
sensitivity of the results to the time period used in the baseline estimation. As the reported 
results demonstrate, this change in estimation has virtually no impact on our results. 
Additionally, we consider the relationship between constitutional protection and the growth 
rate of women’s parliamentary representation, instead of its level, averaged over the period 
from 2002-2011 (constitutional protection and other time-variant controls are measured as of 
2002). As the results reported in column (8) demonstrate, the relationship between 
constitutional protection and the average growth rate of women’s parliamentary 
representation is statistically significant and positive. As a final step, we consider a further 
alternative measure of women’s political representation: the share of ministerial positions 
occupied by women. Data on this variable is available as of 2012 from the World Bank 
(2014). As the results reported in column (9) of Table 4 demonstrate, the estimated 
relationship between constitutional protection and women in cabinet is positive and similar in 
magnitude to the relationship between constitutional protection and women in parliament.  
However, the estimated standard error is large, yielding the coefficient statistically 
insignificant. This potentially suggests that while constitutional provisions contribute to the 
advancement of women into parliaments, they do not raise the glass ceiling for women in 
politics to the degree that would enable their representation in ministerial cabinet positions – 
a possibility that needs to be validated by future research.  
 
Addressing endogeneity 
The results so far suggest a positive effect of constitutional protection on women’s 
representation in parliament. However, while including a large set of controls likely mitigates 
the effect of unobserved heterogeneity, the estimated coefficient on constitutional protection 
may still remain biased if this set is not exhaustive. The possibility of reverse causation (with 
women’s representation in parliament potentially leading to constitutions favourable to 
women) has also not been fully discounted. Here we directly address the issue of bias in our 
estimates by using an instrumental variable for identification. To be valid, such instrument 
needs to be correlated with constitutional protection but uncorrelated with women in 
parliament, except through the variables we control for.  
The protection clauses on gender-based discrimination should be more commonly 
found in constitutions containing a large number of different human rights provisions.  
Motivated by this conjecture, we use the number of rights provisions contained in a country’s 
constitution as an instrument (sourced from Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and James 
Melton 2014). We re-estimate the relationship between constitutional protection and women 
in parliament using 2SLS regression. The first stage is reported in column (1) of Table 5. Our 
instrument is correlated with constitutional protection (this relationship is significant at the 1 
per cent significance level). The corresponding second stage results reported in column (3) of 
the Table are consistent with our baseline results and confirm the positive and statistically 
significant relationship between constitutional protection and women in parliament. 
Moreover, they are higher in magnitude suggesting negative bias in our baseline estimates. 
Based on the Hausman test results reported at the bottom of Column (3), we reject the null 
hypothesis that constitutional protection is exogenous. This underscores the importance of 
addressing the endogeneity of constitutional protection in determining its effect on women’s 
parliamentary representation.  
The exclusion restriction implied by our IV regression is that, conditional on the 
controls included in the regression, rights provisions contained in a country’s constitution 
have no effect on women in parliament, other than their effect through constitutional 
protection. We investigate the validity of this restriction by using a simple over-identification 
test.  If the model is over-identified with more excluded instruments than included 
endogenous variables, we are able to test whether the excluded instruments are independent 
of the error term. To than end we add an indicator of whether the rights are included in a 
separate heading/document (rather than being incorporated into various parts) of a 
constitution as an additional instrument for constitutional protection. We use Hansen J 
statistic to test the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. 
The over-identification test and the related results are reported in Table 5. In column (2) we 
report the first stage results using two instruments, while column (4) reports the 
corresponding second stage estimates of the effect of constitutional protection on women’s 
representation in parliament, which remains positive and significant. The results of the over-
identification test appear at the bottom of column (4).  The Hansen J test has a p-value of 
0.33, failing to reject the null hypothesis. We therefore conclude that the test does not yield 
any evidence for a direct effect of our instrument on women in parliament.  
As an additional test for the validity of the exclusion restriction implied by our IV 
regression, we conduct an easy-to-interpret informal test of exogeneity of number of rights, 
by directly regressing it against women in parliament. Column (5) reports the results of a 
regression that excludes constitutional protection. The coefficient on number of rights is 
significant, however it turns insignificant once constitutional protection is controlled for in 
column (6). This confirms that the impact of number of rights on women in parliament likely 
works through its effect on constitutional protection. This provides additional support for the 
validity of our instrumental variable approach and suggests that our estimates likely capture 
the effect of constitutional protection on women’s parliamentary representation.   
As a final robustness check of the results, we include women’s share of the labour 
force as an additional explanatory variable for women in parliament, as suggested in some of 
the existing studies (e.g. Torben Iversen and Frances Rosenbluth 2008; Daniel Stockemer and 
Maeve Byrne 2012). We did not include this measure in the baseline model explaining 
women’s parliamentary representation, as it is potentially endogenous to constitutional 
protection. This measure likely incorporates several aspects of women’s supply, including 
their qualifications but also unobserved cultural aspects around participation (Didier Ruedin 
2012). As the results of the 2nd stage regression reported in the last column of Table (5) 
show, women in labour force is statistically significantly linked to women’s share in 
parliament. However, its inclusion produces only a modest drop in the constitutional 
protection coefficient. This also suggests limited scope for the possibility that constitutional 
protection increases women’s parliamentary representation by simply increasing the number 
of women who work outside the home.  
 
Transmission mechanisms 
Our finding on the positive effect of constitutional protection on women’s parliamentary 
representation raises a number of important questions, especially about the reasons for the 
effect. We can suggest several. First, entrenchment of a provision against gender-based 
discrimination in a constitution may lead to an increased political representation of women 
directly through the electoral mechanism. For example, the provision may put extra pressure 
on political parties to have female candidates on their lists, and it may result in more 
resources and capacity for women to launch political careers and get elected. Second, a 
change in a country’s political culture may result, leading to more favourable electoral 
outcomes for women not only through the increased supply of female candidates but also 
through increased participation of female voters and more votes given to female candidates. 
As Helen Irving (2005, 21) argues, constitutional provisions make important symbolic 
statements and help name disadvantage. In doing so they can create important impetus for 
positive change.  
In most cases, however, constitutions rarely contain a lot of instrumental details but 
rather provide guidance on the type of decisions to be made. In the words of Peter C. 
Ordeshook (1993: 231f): “A constitution is not a piece of legislation; it is the mechanism 
people use to guide the formulation of legislation and law.” To shed light on this issue we 
conduct two additional empirical explorations.  
First, we explore whether constitutional protection from gender-based discrimination 
is systematically correlated with the legislated quotas for women’s presence in the lower 
house of parliament (source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 
Inter-Parliamentary Union and Stockholm University 2014). In our estimation sample, 53.3 
per cent of countries have some form of legislated quotas. The results of a bivariate probit 
regression model using the number of rights as an instrument for constitutional protection, as 
shown in column (1) of Table 6, suggest that having constitutional protection increases the 
probability of introducing quotas by 32.8 percentage points.   
Second, we consider whether laws on non-discrimination in hiring practices on the 
basis of gender are also more likely to be found in places with constitutional protection (here 
our data come from the International Finance Corporation and World Bank 2012). In our 
estimation sample, 73.1 per cent of countries do have such laws. As the results reported in 
column (2) of Table 6 demonstrate, countries with constitutional protection have a 17.7 
percentage point higher probability of having these laws. Therefore, it appears that the 
adoption of legislation targeting women’s under-representation is a potentially important 
mechanism linking constitutions with women’s political representation.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Based on a large cross-country dataset, this study has shown that women’s representation in 
parliament is larger in countries with constitutional protection from gender-based 
discrimination. Our baseline estimates suggest that the presence of such protection results in 
over a three and a half percentage point increase in women’s share of parliamentary seats. 
Our more detailed analysis of this data show that places with constitutional protection from 
gender-based discrimination are likely to have legislations directly targeting women’s under-
representation.  
These results underscore the role of constitutional design in promoting women’s 
political agency and suggest that constitutional building processes offer some opportunities to 
enhance and protect women’s agency. Our findings thus support existing case study evidence 
that suggests that constitutional provisions are an important part of the institutional structure 
influencing gender rights. This does not deny that a constitution, however progressive, will 
not guarantee gender equity. The presence of enforcement mechanisms, political finance and 
access to campaign funding are amongst a myriad factors affecting the ability to translate 
constitutional gender provisions into improved rates of women’s representation in parliament. 
However, the constitutional provisions are an important part of this puzzle.  As Helen Irving 
(2008, 21), argues, the wording of a constitution is of ‘immense significance’: 
A well-designed constitution is better that one that is poorly designed, and a 
constitution that is well designed and also sensitive to the goals of gender equity, 
equity, and agency, is better still. 
Thus, the struggle to protect and enhance women’s agency should incorporate 
constitutional/legal strategies wherever they are possible. Constitutional protection from 
gender-based discrimination appears to be an important part of an enabling framework for the 
development of improved policies – and the achievement of better outcomes for women. 
These insights might be especially relevant to nations going through constitutional reforms 
and in those countries that do not have alternative (non-constitutional) capacities to ensure 
women’s representation. 
The empirical nature of this paper has produced a relatively ‘broad-brush’ analysis of 
the links between constitutional protections from gender-based discrimination and women’s 
representation in parliament. It helps to identify – and justify – potential indicators of 
women’s agency and voice relating to constitutions and other institutions. However, it does 
not contain the necessary, nuanced detail on how constitutional provisions might (and might 
not) translate into tangible policy outcomes. This task will need to be taken up in further, 
detailed case studies of constitutions (and constitutional change) and their effects on women’s 
agency. Studies of this type ideally will also explore how the effects of constitutional gender 
provisions are influenced by a range of potentially mitigating factors, such as enforcement 
mechanisms, political finance and access to campaign funding. 
As improved data sets on gender distinctions in different laws become available it 
should also be possible to use more fine-grained measures to quantitatively assess the 
constitutional distinctions between countries and their relevance to women’s agency. The 
efforts of Adele Cassola, Amy Raub, Danielle Folet and Jody Heymann (2014) are creating 
important new opportunities for work of this type. Their efforts to construct measures of a 
range of constitutional gender provisions (ranging, for example, from gender equality and 
non-discrimination to equality in family rights) suggest exciting opportunities for future 
studies of types of gender constitutional provisions that are most important to women’s 
agency and key outcomes, such as the gender pay gap and levels of gender-based violence. 
With the passage of time, greater levels of constitutional change are likely to be measured
6
, 
and this will create further opportunities for empirical studies of the gender effects of 
constitutional provisions.  
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 Adele Cassola, Amy Raub, Danielle Folet and Jody Heymann (2014, 210) note that it is 
currently difficult to measure change in constitutions. 
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Table 1: Description of variables 
Variable Definition and source Mean 
(s.d.) 
Min Max 
Dependent variable     





Independent variables     
Constitutional 
protection  
Dummy for a country whose constitution has a non-discrimination clause covering gender 




Ln GDP per capita Natural log of per capita GDP measured in constant 2011 international dollars based on 














Dummy for systems with proportional representation/ where the candidates are elected 
based on the share of votes received by their party (Thorsten Beck, George  Clarke, Alberto  




Polity Score capturing the regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 






















Dummy for Scandinavian legal origin (Rafael La Porta, Florencio  Lopez-de-Silanes and 




Note – N=106; All variables are defined as of 2011 unless explicitly specified otherwise.  
 
Table 1: Description of variables (continued) 
Variable Definition and source Mean 
(s.d.) 
Min Max 
Independent variables     
Age of constitution Number of years since the constitution was enacted (Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and 




Muslim share Share of Muslim adherents as of 2010 (Zeev Maoz and Errol A. Henderson 2013) 21.65 
(33.40) 
0 99 
Christian share Share of Christianity adherents as of 2010 (Zeev Maoz and Errol A. Henderson 2013) 55.56 
(35.04) 
0 97.93 





Communist past Dummy for countries that had a communist system at any point since 1960 (Michael L. 




Years of intra-state war Number of years between 1816-2007 that the country was involved in an internal war 




Years of interstate war Number of years between 1816-2007 that the country was involved in an interstate war 




Africa Dummy for a country in Africa 0.21 
(0.41) 
0 1 
Asia Dummy for a country in Asia 0.28 
(0.45) 
0 1 
Europe Dummy for a country in Europe 0.30 
(0.46) 
0 1 
North America Dummy for a country in North America 0.10 
(0.31) 
0 1 
Oceania Dummy for a country in Oceania 0.02 
(0.14) 
0 1 
South America Dummy for a country in South America 0.08 
(0.28) 
0 1 
Note - N=106; All variables are defined as of 2011 unless explicitly specified otherwise.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics by subgroups 
  Mean of constitutional 
protection 
(s.d.) 
Mean of women in parliament 
(s.d.) 














































Note – Countries with Polity scores ranging from +6 to +10 are categorized as democratic 

































Table 3: Constitutional protection and women in parliament: OLS regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 























































2.512   
(2.973) 










































































No No No Yes 
N 117 106 106 106 
R-squared 0.21 0.36 0.44 0.45 
Note –Robust standard errors are in parenthesis; * denotes significance at 10 per cent level, 








Table 4: Constitutional protection and women in politics: OLS regressions - sensitivity checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (8) (9) 
 Dependent variable: 
 Women in parliament Women in 
parliament, 


























3.002    
(2.170) 


























Ln GDP   0.278 
(1.002) 
     
Ln GNI per 
capita 




   
Ln GNI per 
capita squared 
   1.491 
(0.937) 
    
Ln GNI     0.310 
(1.001) 
   
Other baseline 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Continent 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 101 97 106 105 105 73 71 104 
R-squared 0.56 0.52 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.62 0.35 0.55 
Note – (1) excludes observations based on DFITS; (2) excludes observations based on DFBETA. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis; * 




Table 5: Constitutional protection and women in parliament: Addressing endogeneity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 2SLS 1st stage 2SLS 2nd stage OLS 2SLS 1st stage 2SLS 2nd stage 


































Section on rights  0.488** 
(0.223) 
 Excluded     
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Continent dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test of excluded 
instruments 
44.10 18.68     41.03  
Hausman test (p-value)   0.08 0.04    0.08 
Hansen J (p-value)    0.33     
N 104 80 104 80 104 104 104 104 
R-squared 0.42 0.52 0.40 0.32 0.44 0.44 0.42 0.46 
Note – Number of rights is the number of rights provisions contained in a constitution. Section on rights is a dummy for constitutions where the 
rights are included in a separate heading/document rather than being incorporated into various parts. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis; * 





Table 6: Constitutional protection and laws on women: Bivariate probit regressions  
 (1) (2) 
 Dependent variable: 
 Legislated quotas Hiring non-discrimination laws 




Baseline controls Yes Yes 
Continent dummies Yes Yes 
N 77 104 
Likelihood-ratio test of 
Rho=0 (p-value) 
0.00 0.01 
Note - Number of rights (defined in the note for Table 5) is used as an instrument. Average 
marginal effects are reported. Standard errors are in parenthesis; * denotes significance at 10 
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